Showing posts with label Korzybski. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korzybski. Show all posts

Thursday, August 7, 2014

Atlas Shrugged?: A Korzybskian Look at Ayn Rand

I wrote this piece many years ago in a journal notebook after struggling as best I could to get through Ayn Rand's epic novel of ideas, Atlas Shrugged. I didn't find it at all compelling as a novel. Her square-jawed, steely grey-eyed, and singularly humorless heroes and heroines had too little human glow and complexity to make them believable to me. It was not her character's seriousness I didn't like but what seemed to me then and now as their over-extended, overly-confident certainties, which reflected Ayn Rand's own views but which I didn't see as so certain. For what it's worth here's my evaluation from 1979 of her views. My assessment 2014 remains pretty much the same: in some ways admiring but ultimately appalled. So here, my youthful review—with some emendation—of Atlas Shrugged: 

Ayn Rand's story in Atlas Shrugged tells what happens in a society when all the competent people leave. Her purpose: to paint a picture and philosophy of what she calls the "heroic man" and of the opposite whom she calls the "mystic". 

What does her philosophy consist of? In broad strokes: in its emphasis on reason, the lone individual, criticism of religious values and social conformity; it has a certain nietzschean flavor which I do admire. But Rand (not only in Atlas Shrugged) lacked the all-important grace and humor of expression and the complexity of distinctions that often relieved Nietzsche's work for me. In a way, her work seems like a shadow puppet of Nietzsche's views, overgeneralized and lacking in Nietzsche's essential saving graces. Indeed, Rand's philosophy has the flavor of the worst of Nietzsche: the adolescent trumpeting of cartoonish romanticism in the most tedious parts of his Zarathustra

Rand may have gotten some direct inspiration from Nietzsche, but in an epilogue to her book, she acknowledged her main debt to Aristotle. Her unabashed aristotelianism—and I specifically refer here to her elevation of 'the laws of thought' (Aristotle's epistemology, as it were) and underlying structural assumptions (his metaphysics) formalized by him and his followers—puts her more in cahoots with medieval scholasticism than she would probably have cared to admit and makes her philosophy, though on the surface free-thinking and libertarian, ultimately a reactionary one.  

As with Korzybski, Rand is interested in the question, 'what is man?' [the usage 'man' referring to both male and female humans]. Rand answers that man is a being of volitional consciousness. Matter simply exists. Non-existence is a null set. The existence of living things as living things is not so unconditional. There is even for plants and animals the alternative of non-existence as a living thing. Plants and animals have for the most part fairly automatic programs of activity for their continuation of life. However, man requires the making of choices. Proper choices for the continued survival of a human being are not automatically programmed but call for thought.  According to Rand then, for living things the basic alternative is to live or not to live (shades of Hamlet). And for man this choice boils down to the choice: to think or not to think. Thinking and to think well, for Rand, is the primary moral commandment. 

Rand outlines a trilogy of values for human life. A value consists of "that which one acts to gain and keep", what one holds dear, one's standard of behavior. And Rand's trilogy of human values consists of: First, Reason, the use of the mind to enhance one's existence as a living thing; Second, Purpose, the development of the proper goals for a reasonable life; and Third, Self-Esteem, the confidence one has in one's abilities to solve the problems and confront the challenges of one's life. 

Virtue, for Rand, consists of those sort of actions in which one gains and keeps those values of life. The virtuous actions include honesty, independence, integrity, rationality, justice, productivity. Honesty consists of not faking existence, not pretending that something is so that isn't so. Independence is the insistence on using one's own thinking apparatus to come to conclusions, i.e., "I know what I know." Integrity consists of not faking one's consciousness, i.e., not agreeing on an opposing viewpoint just to be sociable. Rationality is the insistent use of one's thinking apparatus as opposed to blanking out, e.g., depending on one's wishes to guide one's view of reality.  Justice consists of judging other men and valuing them according to their nature, not in loving indiscriminately those who don't deserve it. Productivity is shaping reality, ones life, the earth, through the application of one's reason. 

Rand emphasizes the importance of productivity and it serves as the basis for her idea that capitalism is the most reasonable politico-economic relationship. In this regard it seems significant that she labels the ideal man of her system of thought, the trader. The trader produces things, ideas, with the practice of the virtues in the service of the values  mentioned before. He does not demand that the products and property of another man are his due or that he is obligated to turn to anyone else. His only right is to be allowed to follow and use his own reason. To coerce another to do as he would like is to demand that the other choose between life and reason, which is really anti-life no matter which he chooses. Therefore the use of physical violence except in self-defense is immoral in Ayn Rand's eyes. 

The ideal relationship between people is rather one that is entered into contractually, as serving the self-interest of both parties, i.e., exchange for trade. Any ideology that demands self-sacrifice and downgrades selfishness is evil in Rand's eyes. 

She sees two schools of Western thought that are in this anti-life, anti-reason vein. One, the spirit mystics, are represented by the Church. In this school, the nature of man is considered sinful (original sin) and self-sacrifice is encouraged. The other school, the muscle mystics, claim that society is more important than the individual and that individual desires must be sacrificed for the good of the entire system. She sees a large number of intellectual trends supporting this latter view. The two schools of mystics though apparently far apart are brothers under the skin and have supported oppressive governments since the long ago ages. 

Rand is a minimalist in her view of government's role: a police function should exist to protect individuals from coercion and violence of others. An army should exist to protect citizens from foreign invasion and coercion. Courts should exist where people can settle disputes. Beyond that, nothing else—government should be kept to a bare minimum. So far so good?

Not exactly.
 Rand cut her heroes from a cartoonish mold where, just as with the fabled politician, they built with their own two hands the log cabin they were born in. She elevates to sacred doctrine an extreme individualism that takes little to no account, even scorns, the social matrix upon which any individual human accomplishment is based. Her version of individuality, is embodied in the title of one of her books The Virtue of Selfishness. She has no place for altruism, as she defines it, at all, at all.  

In response to this sort of view, Korzybski told the following story to his seminar students. at his 1948-1949 Winter Intensive Seminar: 
…some friends gave a dinner for my wife and me, and they invited also an Oxford graduate,…very wealthy, educated, Oxford and so on. He was extremely British in what is definitely known—it is seldom believed in America but they believe in it—that’s the British theory of selfishness. And he was nagging me all through the dinner—I had of course to tell them some development in [my work]; naturally they all expected me to say something. Well, I did. He was nagging, interrupting, and I was trying to explain to him time-binding, how we are not like animals, every one for himself and all of that, but we are interdependent. We build upon the work of the dead, and we depend on the work of every one else in our civilization and so on. And I was telling how I worked to get my formulations, to deal with human messes all around.

Then he began to pick at me: ‘why was I so ‘altruistic’, doing all this work for my fellow men?’—I don’t know what not. ‘Oh, this ‘altruism’ would not work, there is no sense in it, a selfish outlook is the only workable one’, and so on and so on, picking at me with his theories about ‘selfishness’. And ultimately I got annoyed with that petty criticism, that picking at me. I just shut him up—successfully. I said, ‘You want me to be selfish? I am selfish! I work the way I work because I don’t want to live in a world made by men like you!’ That shut him up alright.

In a way—this is serious—remember there is no sense talking whether I am selfish or not, because that argument remains valid that I am say ‘altruistic’ because I eventually want a better world for me to live in. But you see the argument: ‘selfish’-‘unselfish’ is actually useless. It is a good place for quarreling. … 
[This quote comes from the CD audio record of Korzybski’s 1948-1949 Winter Intensive Seminar (available for purchase from the Institute of General Semantics) combined with material (missing in the recording) from the unpublished transcript of the seminar.]

Ayn Rand's  downplay of the social, time-binding nature of human existence is cemented by her view of rationality. The essence of rationality lies in submission to the aristotelian "laws of thought".  The law of identity states that A is A. In Rand's words "Existence exists...existence is identity." That is a stone and cannot turn into water whatever a thirsty man in the desert may wish. Reason consists of integrating and identifying the identities (essence or what is) of existence. 

The tool of reason is logic; logic being the art of non-contradictory identification. Contradiction cannot be tolerated. The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. Any action implies an entity, an actor. The notion that
activity and process can go on in its own right as some modern philosopher suggest is irrational, for it implies that these activities are caused by nothing. According to Rand, there are two sides to any argument, the right side, and the wrong side including the fence straddling side. She sees as fence straddling and denial of the law of identity to find, for instance, good qualities in a rotter. A man is either a rotter or he isn't and cannot be both a rotter and a non-rotter at the same time. Can you see now that Rand follows her premises of thought to the letter. Admirable. But, it is not her espousal of reason, various virtues and values that I disagree with but rather with her characterization of reason. 

I do not deny that an 'objective' world exists, external to our senses. But I dispute Rand's fundamental premise that existence is 'identity' and the role of reason as identification. 'Whatever I say something is, it is not', said Korzybski—and so do I. 

Yes, the function of reason to integrate the evidence of our senses and verbally formulate our notions of what is going on seems very important for intelligent advancement in life. But to believe that we have thereby discovered and pinned down the 'identity' or exact unchanging nature of what we are talking about does not seem intelligent or reasonable to me, especially in light of what is now known in neurology and in physics. The word is not the thing, the map is not the territory. And a reasonable, rational use of one's reason seems to me to require that one always be on vigil against the temptation to identify one's classifications with non-verbal reality. Logic, the art of 'non-contradictory identifications' as Rand puts it, appears necessary but not sufficient as a guide to one's reason. As a tool for deriving conclusions from premises it is needed; as a guide to reality it is faulty. For it seems very much possible that a person can 'be' both a "son of a bitch" and a wonderful person at the same time. 

I have little doubt that Ayn Rand, though an atheist, would have responded to Korzybski's views with as much horror as did the Jesuit professor of mathematics, who met Korzybski at a A. A. A. S. (American Association for the Advancement of Science) conference they both attended in 1931. After Korzybski's presentation on "A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics and Physics" (published as Supplement III in Science and Sanity), the Jesuit professor, came up to him to protest. As Korzybski later described it, the professor told him: 
…I destroy the very foundation of ‘religion’ and I should abandon it or I will get in trouble with the church and get on the index. Among others he said “You certainly will not deny that everything is identical with itself.” I asked him if he ever heard of modern physics, and as he admitted that he teaches it, I said “I certainly will deny that a submicroscopic process is ever ‘identical’ with itself.” He said nothing to that, but on his face he exhibited the most bewildered and horrified attitude. (AK to William Morton Wheeler, 7/16/1933. Alfred Korzybski Digital Archives, 24.78)

Yes, Aristotle’s logic may still remain useful—where it applies as a limited set of guidelines for discourse. But as the overarching basis for human ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’, as Ayn Rand interpreted it, the essentialist structural assumptions or metaphysics which Aristotle’s logic embodies no longer hold.

To conclude, both her view of humanity (in it's undervaluing of human time-binding inter-dependence) and her view of rationality (with its over-valuing of aristotelian logic), make Ayn Rand's views seriously deficient and unreliable guides to reason or life. 

Friday, May 2, 2014

The Problems Of Knowing What Korzybski Actually Taught

The problems of knowing what Korzybski actually taught started to get complicated even during his lifetime as inadequate popularizers—the most prominent of whom was probably S.I. Hayakawa—began the process of watering it down. This became one of the major hassles at the end of Korzybski's life that he had to deal with. The not-so-pleasant details of his conflict with Hayakawa and other of his students, takes up a good part of the last section of my Korzybski: A Biography.
After Korzybski's death, Hayakawa very much became Mr. General Semantics, in the eyes of the media and general public, and through his own writing and his editorship of ETC. then published by the International Society of General Semantics (ISGS). Although, he did help promulgate knowledge and interest in Korzybski's work to some extent, at the same time his work gave the impression to many that they had gotten Korzybski's essence from reading his, Hayakawa's, and others' more limited, non-rigorous takes.

Meanwhile, the Institute of General Semantics (IGS), founded by Korzybski and run by his students and student's students, remained the center of specifically korzybskian general-semantics, with publication of the GSB and books by Korzybski and others as well as an ongoing educational training program continued for just over fifty years after Korzybski's death.

However, over the last 10 years, that korzybskian thread got snipped and lost at the Institute of General Semantics. The ISGS folded, the IGS took over its assets, mainly some bookstore books, some documents, and the journal ETC. GSB got retired with no fanfare and we now have people running the IGS who for better or worse were never significantly involved in studying, transmitting, and building upon the specific korzybskian tradition that existed there before their time. The present IGS seems more in the pattern  of the old ISGS rather than the old IGS  with, for example, ETC. now the official IGS journal. This kind of thing can happen. People die and move away, etc. Others who get involved afterwards don't know what happened before them and fail to ask necessary questions. 
History and tradition gets forgotten. It may happen especially to organizations that have been around for a long while. As a result, the long-term culture of the organization can  sometimes change drastically. It has happened at the Institute of General Semantics (founded in 1938). Dating. 

The fact remains that now the IGS has lost a large part of the specific korzybskian tradition (much of it 'oral') that developed there. For example, I don't see how anyone of my teachers and co-workers in the old IGS would have chosen to name a book award after S.I. Hayakawa—with all due respect to him (he did do some good work along with all the confusion he caused). I have written about this institutional loss of memory publicly, addressing the issue directly in my presentation at the 2011 IGS International Conference in New York City, where I was given the IGS's 2011 S.I. Hayakawa Book Prize (Oh, the irony). Here's a link to the audio and text of my presentation: http://korzybskifiles.blogspot.com/2011/11/korzybskis-legacy-what-is-it-how-do-we.html

As one of the few alive, like Jeff Mordkowitz and my wife Susan Presby Kodish, who apprenticed with Korzybski's students, I feel an obligation now to help inform everyone interested of what that tradition consists of. I 'inherited' (as the person appointed by Charlotte Schuchardt Read to serve as Korzybski's literary executor following her and Robert Pula) a tremendous amount of material after the IGS closed Read House in Texas in 2009 (and then the nearby rented office in 2010). I intend to share as much as I can of the material that I have from there as well the large amount of stuff I've gathered over a lifetime of korzybskian study and research. 

But people who care  and desire to learn must ask questions.

Will you dare to inquire?  

Monday, December 9, 2013

"General Semantics: An Approach to Effective Language Behavior"


My friend Steve Stockdale, former Executive Director of the Institute of General Semantics (2004 through 2007) has been involved in developing this online course: "General Semantics: An Approach to Effective Language Behavior" For that reason alone, I feel confident in recommending it to anyone who wants to try an online course and would like a structured introduction to the subject.

I say this despite my qualms about the course's focus on language behavior here, which I consider too narrow and therefore potentially confusing if you want to develop a comprehensive understanding of Korzybski's work.  Because I see GS as a value-infused, applied study of human evaluation/epistemology (how we know what we know) and a non-aristotelian foundation for the human sciences, I would not describe 'general semantics' as this course description does.

I have come to this view, because such a focus on 'language' by people like S. I. Hayakawa, has historically misled students into neglecting a great deal of Korzybski's work that doesn't fit into the 'language studies' box. However, the radically inter-disciplinary nature of 'general semantics' has traditionally made it difficult to classify it in terms of traditional academic boxes. So here we are. It's an old story.

That said, we surely can't leave 'language' out of the picture. As Korzybskian scholar and former Executive Editor of the General Semantics Bulletin, Jim French has written: "As a field of study, general semantics is not predominantly about language but (one might say) about neuro-evaluating; and yet language and how we use it play a prominent role in apprehending and using the discipline." ("Editor's Essay 2001, General Semantics Bulletin, 65-68, p. 8-10)

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Wittgenstein - On the Function of his Writing

"I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own."
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1947

Foreword to Philosophical Investigationstrans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1953. p. x.  

Monday, April 8, 2013

Ayn Nation Under God - A Review


The full title of Hart William’s book of connected essays, Ayn Nation Under God: A Rational Examination As To Why Ayn Rand Is Full Of It, indicates Williams' intent and point of view quite well. The essays (most of which appeared in slightly different form on Williams' blog from 2005 to 2012)  do not pretend to any faux ‘objectivity’. But despite his generally negative opinion of Ayn Rand’s work, her fans and followers will make a mistake if they dismiss Williams’ ebook, available in Amazon Kindle format, as not worthy of their reading time and effort. For them, and for the non-fans of Rand—in and out of academia—many of whom have dismissed her work as unimportant, Williams provides a most valuable service by treating Rand with the respect she deserves as one of the most influential figures of mid-20th Century to early 21st Century American thought. 

A veteran print journalist, blogger, screenwriter, novelist and all-around scribe (see His Vorpal Sword) Williams adduces a great deal of evidence to show that Rand—founder of a philosophical school she called "Objectivism"—has become a revered figure and a major inspiration for the Republican Right (especially its more secular wing representing finance and banking) and the allied Libertarian movement, both of which cherish and feel bolstered by Rand’s uber-individualist, anti-government, but pro-corporate outlook. Williams has carefully studied Rand’s work and his “rational examination” focuses on her basic premises: her view of ‘reason’, which he finds inadequate, and her basic understanding of human nature, which he finds lacking, indeed monstrously so. His criticism seems to me—a student and advocate of Alfred Korzybski’s non-aristotelian viewpoint—devastatingly apt.

Although Williams has not studied Korzybski’s work, he has clearly been influenced by some of the ongoing non-aristotelian currents that Korzybski saw developing in the  scientific, intellectual culture of his time, which he sought to systematize and enhance by means of the teachable system that he called “general semantics”. Non-aristotelian I should emphasize was not for Korzybski anti-Aristotle, not even anti aristotelian logic. Aristotle’s logic, for example, may still remain useful—where it applies. But Korzybski did reject the essentialist structural assumptions or metaphysics which Aristotle’s logic in particular embodies when interpreted, as Ayn Rand did, as the overarching basis for human ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’ rather than as a limited set of guidelines for some forms of discourse.

 In his first and perhaps best chapter (written especially for the book), Williams, who as a college philosophy major studied mathematical logic, gives his take on Rand’s trumpeting of the aristotelian ‘laws of thought’ and ‘pure logic’ as the basis for ‘reason’ (in Atlas Shrugged, she titled the three sections of the book “Non-Contradiction”, “Either-Or”, and “A is A”). Williams writes that when he first saw her “A is A” years ago, he said “When?”: “A is A sometimes, but other times it’s not exactly A. In fact, when you say A, you are just specifying THIS A at THAT exact moment in time, which that A will never be again. But it’s close enough for government work, or, in this case, anti-government work.” Williams further discussion of aristotelian logic seems quite in keeping with Korzybski’s take: overdependence on it by using it as a general orientation, as Rand and her followers do, leads to evaluational rigidity and inflexibility.

William’s critique of Rand’s view of human nature also appears quite devastating. Rand cut her heroes from a cartoonish mold where, just as with the fabled politician, they built with their own two hands the log cabin they were born in. She elevates to sacred doctrine an extreme individualism that takes little to no account of the social matrix upon which any individual human accomplishment is based. Perhaps Williams doesn’t know much about Korzybski’s characterization of humanity as the time-binding class of life, but throughout the book he demonstrates his implicit understanding of the time-binding character of humanity and its incompatibility with Rand’s extreme version of individuality, embodied in the title of one of her books The Virtue of Selfishness. Rand erroneously embraces “[a]n almost universal human trait…the ability to discount the endless contributions of others to our thinking process, while magnifying our own ‘original’ thinking beyond all measure. This is the basis of the American mythos of the ‘Self-made man…”

Rand’s extreme elevation of the virtue of selfishness has no place for altruism at all, at all.  According to Rand, Williams notes, “[o]nly when this awful, ridiculous moral notion of self-sacrifice and altruism is rejected will the thinkers/creators/Atlases be free to create. Until then, Galt [one of Rand’s heros in Atlas Shrugged] says, they’re out.” 

On the contrary, “Man is a SOCIAL animal,” Williams writes, “but Ayn Rand and her adherents insanely reject this fundamental truth. As a result, while a few have enriched themselves, our society is falling apart, and our infrastructure is rotting.” Thus Rand’s work provides the perfect theoretical basis for the current extreme view of individualism supported by ‘tea-party’ advocates, ‘libertarian’ think tanks, and the right-wing Republicans, among others. An example of the latter is former Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, Paul Ryan, a staunch right-wing Catholic, who during the campaign attempted to distance himself from the staunch atheist, Rand, he once admired and touted. But despite his new found love for St. Thomas Aquinas, Ryan still seems to be pushing the virtue of selfishness. Not very christian according to some christian’s measures, but then again, as Williams points out, “nobody ever went broke providing millionaires with a rationalization for the morality of greed.” At the moment, Congressman Ryan seems to be doing quite well. 

The book's title, Ayn Nation Under God, might have been better titled Ayn Nation Under Galt, but then again maybe Hart Williams’ title is appropriate if we accept Albert Ellis's affirmative answer to the question that was also the title of his book critiquing Rand, "Is Objectivism A Religion?" At any rate, Hart Williams' book provides a remarkably non-aristotelian look at what is unfortunately becoming (at least to me) Ayn Nation Under Rand. If you want to understand a great deal more about the present, polarized, aristotelian orientation that dominates the political climate in the U.S. you can't do better than read Hart William's book. My summary and quotes don’t do justice to his writing. He tenders his conclusions with a large portion of supporting detail served with verve and wit in an extremely inexpensive book. All the more reason to get: Ayn Nation Under God

















Sunday, March 10, 2013

Chain Indexing

The Chain Index, which Korzybski developed in the mid-1940s has significantly bedeviled generations of students of Korzybski's work. "Supermoderator" in the RGS forum has done what I rate as a better job of explaining it than even Korzybski did.

The 'chain' part comes from the analogy to the "chain reaction", for example when there is a doubling or other multipication of some process with each iteration of the process, for example, a nuclear or chemical chain reaction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_reaction ).


With the chain index, we make our own little chain reaction of differences, of differentiating one thing in our classification or naming, so one thing becomes two things or more depending on the context of time and place (although the time dimension can be taken care of with the device of dating). Further differentiating as to context, can go on indefinitely, although it is probably often not necessary.

It's not only organism(1)-as-a-whole-in-environment(1) different from organism(1)-as-a-whole-in environment(2). It's every thing-as-a-whole-in-its-environment different from 'itself' in a different environment. Ken Keyes called it the "when index". It remains a matter of assessment to decide whether the differences makes a difference to us or not (in a particular time and location). In other words, our assessments of this should best be chain-indexed as well if we want to remain careful evaluators.

Want to join the chain-indexing gang?

Saturday, March 3, 2012

Quote of the Day–'Money Is Information'

" "Jesus and Ludwig Christ!" Clem Cotex cried. He jumped up and turned off the tapes, totally At One with the doctrine of Religiosophy. "Money is information," he muttered, beginning to pace the room, stoned out of his gourd. "Holy snakes and ladders. 'Humanity is the symbol-using class of life, and those who control symbols control us.' I read that in Korzybski aeons ago. Information!" "
Robert Anton Wilson, Schrodinger's Cat

Friday, December 16, 2011

From the Stray Thought Bin - 'The Heroic Task of Every Generation'

The heroic task of every generation of time-binders (that's us humans): appropriating our inheritance from those who came before us. Every generation does the task to some degree poorly or well. What makes the task heroic?: The stakes are always high and for every new generation, including our own, its particular inheritance is never the same as—indeed is necessarily different than—any that came before. 

Tuesday, August 30, 2011

"Becoming More Fully Human"

Recently a number of people have become interested in previous works by me and my wife Susan, including the book Dare to Inquire: Sanity and Survival for the 21st Century and Beyond.

Here's a nice fat slice of that book, Chapter 4 - "Becoming More Fully Human," where I elaborated on Susan's formulating about some korzybskian notions, humanist 'philosophy', and the work of Abraham Maslow, among other things.  

Some of you may find it controversial.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

"Growing Up Sci Fi"

Don Fagen, co-leader of the legendary Jazz-Rock group Steely Dan, has written about the influence that Korzybski's work had on him via his science fiction reading—A.E. Van Vogt, etc.—as a kid growing up in the Fifties. Interesting stuff!  Here's the link:"The Cortico-Thalamic Pause: Growing Up Sci Fi" 


Thursday, June 3, 2010

"Let Us Consider" by Russell Edson

In his poem "Let Us Consider" Russell Edson is talking about us, our human potential for nuttiness and identification (in the korzybskian sense of the term) not just about some 'strange' wackos. You can read in Korzybski's book Science and Sanity about the continuum that he saw from objectification of higher order abstractions, to delusions, to illusions, to hallucinations. You can also read about the fuzzy continuum from 'sane' (and who is fully sane) to unsanity to insanity. I know many so-called 'normal', so-called 'sane' people who are clearly going in the 'wrong' direction along that continuum and are not as far as they think from frying roses and scraping shadows. Some of them have thought of themselves as 'general semanticists'. I, of course, am not excluded from consideration. "Let Us Consider", indeed. 

Monday, February 1, 2010

Korzybski and Gödel


Alfred Korzybski gave a two-lecture series on “Mathematical Method As A Way Of Life” for The Society of Friends of Scripta Mathematica and The Yeshiva Institute of Mathematics at the Horace Mann Auditorium of Teachers College, Columbia University, in New York City, on the evenings of November 3 and November 10 in 1947. The first lecture had the title “On the Structure of Mathematics and Human Evaluation” and the next one “General Semantics as Applied Physico-Mathematical Method.” These lectures would constitute Korzybski’s last major venture specifically addressing a mainly mathematically-oriented audience.

Given his abiding interest in the foundation of mathematics, mathematical logic, etc., it seems disappointing that Korzybski didn’t have anything to say here—nor anywhere else—about logician Kurt Gödel’s theorems of mathematical incompleteness.[1] In work first published in 1931, Gödel had rigorously shown that “Any formal system strong enough to contain arithmetic could never prove its own consistency.”[2] In other words, such a system will contain “undecidable” statements. Furthermore, “If a system of mathematics does not lead into contradiction, then this fact cannot be demonstrated with the procedures of that system.”[3] To do so with such an “incomplete” system, one needed to go ‘up a level’ to a more comprehensive system of axioms which in turn would contain more undecidable statements.

The implications of these notions for working mathematicians and others still get debated in 2010. Nonetheless, I can't easily dismiss the opinions of physicists Tony Rothman and George Sudarshan, who could write in 1998:
"Briefly put, Kurt Gödel proved mathematically that any consistent mathematical system must contain statements that are impossible to prove within that system. In that Gödel’s theorum puts an absolute limit on the effectiveness of mathematics, it is one of the most powerful statements of epistemology." [4]
Korzybski, though not a mathematical logician, got the quarterly journal of the Association for Symbolic Logic and recommended it to his students, so it seems possible that he had at least heard of Gödel’s work, the importance of which by this time had begun to get recognition in the mathematical logic community and among other mathematicians. Korzybski’s friend, E.T. Bell, for example, had given prominent mention to Gödel in his book The Development of Mathematics (published in 1940 with a second edition in 1945), noting in part that
“…Godel constructed a true theorem such that a formal proof of it leads to a contradiction. Undecidable statements exist: within the system certain assertions can be neither proved nor disproved." [5]
This, unlike others of Bell’s books, was not in Korzybski’s personal library but he may have read it.

The implications of Gödelian incompleteness on Korzybski’s formulations about mathematics, and the implications of Korzybski’s work for Gödel’s, both remain to be explored. Gödel’s use of what Korzybski would call “self-reflexiveness” in his proofs showed an area of connection. On the face of it, Gödelian incompleteness seems to corroborate Korzybski’s uncertaintist stance, extending it with rigour into formal systems of mathematics. Gödelian incompleteness also seems to at least require reconsideration of Korzybski long-held view, which he repeated in his second Scripta talk, that “Mathematical abstractions [dealing with fictitious entities and having no physical content] have [by postulation] all characteristics included [unlike physical or daily-life abstractions], and deduction may work there absolutely.”[6]

And contemplating the picture of the emaciated Gödel in 1978, curled up in fetal position in a hospital room, dying from starvation because he believed that someone was poisoning his food [7]; Korzybski's words from his final Scripta lecture on November 10, 1947, seem to apply:
…do not have a criticism, so to say, about my work, that ‘Korzybski fancies that humans are like geometry; there is a difference between geometry and a human being.’ I didn’t find it that way, because I have found that humans, even ‘insane’ are extremely logical provided you trace their premises, except their premises have no realization in actuality. So that’s the main point, not a problem of logic. From some premises, some consequences follow… [8]
Notes
1. I conclude this based on an examination of his notes from the first lecture and a transcript of the second as well as from a rather thorough scouring of his other writings and correspondence, published and unpublished.

2. Reuben Hersh, 1997. What Is Mathematics, Really?, New York: Oxford University Press., p. 160

3. Reuben Hersh, What Is Mathematics, Really?, p. 161

4. Rothman and Sudarshan, 1998. Doubt and Certainty. Reading, MA; Helix Books., p. 41]

5. Bell, p. 576

6. Korzybski, “General Semantics As Applied Physico-Mathematical Method,” Transcription of a tape recording of Scripta Mathematica lecture, Nov. 10, 1947. Copyright 1954.

7. See Rebecca Goldstein, 2005. Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel. New York: W. W. Norton.

8. Korzybski, “General Semantics As Applied Physico-Mathematical Method,” Transcription of a tape recording of Scripta Mathematica lecture, Nov. 10, 1947. Copyright 1954.

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Helping Soldiers and Veterans Readjust

"Army Will Train Soldiers To Cope With Emotions" says the headline of yesterday's front page New York Times article (August 18, 2009). The story, entitled on the WWW as "Mental Stress Training Is Planned for U.S. Soldiers" details a new $117 Million program that the U.S. Army is instituting to eventually train all 1.1 million soldiers in emotional resiliency. This is part of the Department of Defense's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program . With the 'mental' health problems of depression, 'post-traumatic stress disorder', and suicide coming to the fore as major problems for combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, these issues are now getting the attention they deserve. With consultation from a number of psychologists, such as Martin Seligman, George A. Bonanno, Karen Reivich and others, pilot programs will be started on two military bases with the initial focus on training sergeants who will be able to teach the techniques to enlisted men and women. The methods being taught are based on the work of Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck, among others.

The article made a few related points which 'floored me' as a korzybskian general semantics scholar. First, that this training would be the first of its kind. Not the case—as readers of this blog will soon see. Then quoting from the New York Times article,
"It's important to be clear that there's no evidence that any program makes soldiers more resilient," said George A. Bonanno, a psychologist at Columbia University. But he and others said the program could settle one of the most important questions in psychology: whether mental toughness can be taught in the classroom."
No evidence? Also not the case.

During World War Two, Douglas M. Kelley, a psychiatrist and student of Alfred Korzybski, served as Chief Consultant in Clinical Psychology and Assistant Consultant in Psychiatry to the European Theatre of Operations. Both prior to and after the D-Day invasion of Normandy by Allied Forces, Kelley worked in army hospitals in England and Belgium with psychiatric casualties from "combat exhaustion". Kelley's program of treatment involved intensive but brief classes and group counseling sessions based primarily on Korzybski's educational approach. Kelly also trained non-psychiatrist field medics and surgeons, who served during the Normandy invasion, in these methods . There is some evidence (although statistical data was lost), that the use of these methods with thousands of troops may have had something to do with the reduced number of psychiatric casualties during the D-Day invasion (as compared with previous Allied invasions in North Africa and Italy).

Korzybski, himself, and other of his students also worked with people suffering from what is now referred to as 'post-traumatic stress disorder'.

Kelley's paper on his work in the European Theatre of Operations, "The Use of General Semantics And Korzybskian Principles As An Extensional Method of Group Psychotherapy In Traumatic Neurosis" was originally published in The Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases in 1951, Vol. 114 (3), Sept., pp. 189-220. (In his paper, Kelly presented the details of his classes in sufficient detail for others to reproduce and build upon.)

Korzybski's paper with a case study, "A Veteran's Re-Adjustment and Extensional Methods," was originally published in ETC, Vol. III (4), Summer 1946 and also appeared in part in The American Journal of Psychiatry, "Clinical Notes," Vol. 103, No. 1, July 1946. Korzybski soon had it distributed as a separate reprint. It was reprinted in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, 1920-1950 published by the Institute of General Semantics in 1990. Here is a link to Korzybski's original reprint version: A Veteran's Re-Adjustment and Extensional Methods.

Both papers have been reprinted together along with a number of other seminal articles in the Institute of General Semantics' book General Semantics In Psychotherapy: Selected Writings On Methods Aiding Therapy edited by Isabel Caro and Charlotte Schuchardt Read. (My wife, Susan Presby Kodish also has an article in the book and provided major editorial help in bringing the book into print.) Also available (for less than at Amazon.com) at the Institute of General Semantics E-Bookstore

Shouldn't expert consultants like Bonanno who are helping design the Army's new program to help our troops be a little more careful in making pronouncements about what evidence does or doesn't exist? Especially since this is not the Army's first effort in this kind of thing. In this blog piece, I've pulled some of the forgotten material out of the memory hole. And the project designer-evaluator-researchers including the Army people who are participating in this important program now have no excuse for not educating themselves about what has already been done.

Friday, March 13, 2009

H. Beam Piper

H. Beam Piper remains one of the lesser known science fiction writers. In my opinion, he also qualifies as one of the great ones. And from the evidence of his writings, his study of Korzybski's work influenced him profoundly. I judge that Piper had a much better grasp of Korzybski's work than either Heinlein or Van Vogt, who also made use of it.

Piper had an interesting but tragic life which John F. Carr writes about in H. Beam Piper: A Biography

Piper began to publish stories in John W. Campbell's Astounding Science Fiction magazine in the late 1940s, at the tail-end of what has been called the "Golden Age of Science Fiction." Piper committed suicide in the early 1960s. That's the tragic part. I have liked just about every story of his that I've read.

Murder in the Gunroom (1953) remains his only detective novel. It features a private eye, Jeff Rand, who has seriously studied Korzybski's work:
"That sounds like Korzybski," Pierre said, as they turned onto Route 19 in the village and headed east. "You've read Science and Sanity?"

Rand nodded. "Yes. I first read it in the 1933 edition, back about 1936; I've been rereading it every couple of years since. The principles of General Semantics come in very handy in my business, especially in criminal-investigation work, like this. A consciousness of abstracting, a realization that we can only know something about a thin film of events on the surface of any given situation, and a habit of thinking structurally and of individual things, instead of verbally and of categories, saves a lot of blind-alley chasing. And they suggest a great many more avenues of investigation than would be evident to one whose thinking is limited by intensional, verbal, categories."
Murder in the Gunroom, like many if not all of Piper's works, has gone into what is called "the public domain" and is available free as text at: Murder in the Gunroom-Project Gutenberg and as an audiobook at Murder in the Gunroom-Librivox

I'm going to go now and listen to the audiobook.

Friday, March 6, 2009

The Passion of Knowledge

Lothar Bickel, a student of Constantin Brunner (1) wrote the following to end his wonderful book The Unity of Body and Mind. I think he was describing his teacher and himself. But the quote describes, in general terms, a central aspect of what drove Alfred Korzybski as well.
Our convictions…are, in general easily overthrown and they hold their ground only when they correspond to those vague judgments of our interests that are carried along by our drives and feelings.

The situation is different for the few whose lives are dependent upon the affirmation and negation of cognition, whose existence is centered in the ebb and tide of cognitive processes as vitally and genuinely as it is in that of feeling and volition. Their insights and judgments are powerful existential forces that can well compare with those of common drives and affects. Those men who come upon important truths of science or philosophy have no need of injecting in them the power and strength of repressed emotions in order to make them the most vital concern of their inward lives. From the very beginning the warmest blood of their lives pulsates for their truth which becomes their strongest passion from the very time it first takes root in them. This passion for truth also accounts for the stamp and fortitude of their characters. Self-acquired insights are genuine activities of life-maintainance, and as such they become motions or forces especially in those individuals whose lust for life (“the essence of man itself”) cannot do without knowledge. These few will find in knowledge the fulfillment of their existence. (2)
Notes
(1) You can find a Brunner link in the right sidebar of this blog under "Web Page Links."

(2) Lothar Bickel, The Unity of Body and Mind pp. 164-165.

Sunday, March 1, 2009

William Burroughs and Korzybski

The eclectic mix of students likely to attend an Institute of General Semantics seminar given by Alfred Korzybski might include artists, businessmen, college professors, college students, engineers, doctors, housewives, lawyers, psychiatrists, salesmen, scientists, secretaries, writers, and an occasional mystic. In that regard, the 1939 August Intensive—which ran from August 25 to September 2 (the personal interviews continued until September 6)—had a typical group. However, a number of notable participants also made it one of the more remarkable groups in the history of Korzybski’s Institute seminars. (Not that the 'notable' participants necessarily seemed 'notable' at the time.)

One of these was twenty-five year old William Seward Burroughs II from Clayton, Missouri, grandson to the inventor of the Burroughs Adding Machine, who labeled himself as a “student” on his seminar registration form. One of the future creators of what became known as the Beat movement of mid-Twentieth Century American literature, he had graduated from Harvard in 1936 with an English degree. Since then he had studied anthropology and hoboed around America and Europe. He had already read Science and Sanity and noted on his registration form that he was interested in the “interrelations of language and cultures.” While in Chicago, he stayed at the Y.M.C.A. He had perfect attendance at the thirty-five hour seminar. I have not found any correspondence between the two men but Korzybski and his work undoubtedly had a significant impact on Burroughs. Many years later in 1974 at an interview he said that at the seminar he “…was very impressed by what [Korzybski] had to say. I still am. I think that everyone, everyone, particularly all students should read Korzybski. [It would] save them an awful lot of time.” (1)

For more information on William Burroughs, you might want to check out www.nakedlunch.org which some Burroughs fans have put together as part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of his most well-known novel.

Note
(1) William Burroughs. Press Conference at Berkeley Museum of Art, November 12, 1974. Internet Archive audio. http://www.archive.org/details/BurroughsPressConf

Thursday, February 26, 2009

Gaston Bachelard And Korzybski

It surprises me that more people interested in what is called "Continental Philosophy" have not pursued the links between the work of Gaston Bachelard and Alfred Korzybski. The formulating of each man connects to and informs that of the other. And the two men actually knew and respected each others' work.

Gaston Bachelard agreed to become an Honorary Trustee of the Institute of General Semantics in 1940. (1) Bachelard’s 1934 book Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique, which Korzybski had gotten, already showed the French epistemologist as a compatible formulator.

Since he had written that book, Bachelard had come to know Korzybski’s work and to give it considerable importance. The following excerpt (part of a larger discussion of Korzybski and his work) comes from the English translation of Bachelard’s 1940 book La Philosophie du Non: Essai d’une philosophie de nouvel esprit scientifique. (A translation of this done by a student of Korzybski, G. C. Waterston, was published in the U.S. in 1969 as The Philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind.):
Those of us who are trying to find new ways of thinking, must direct ourselves towards the most complicated structures. We must take advantage of all the lessons of science, however special they may be, to determine new mental structures. We must realize that the possession of a form of thought is automatically a reform of the mind. We must therefore direct our researches towards a new pedagogy. In this direction, which has attracted us personally for a number of years, we shall take as our guide the very important work of the non-Aristotelian school, founded in America by Korzybski, which is so little known in France. …The psychological and even physiological conditions of a non-Aristotelian logic have been resolutely faced in the great work of Count Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity,... [p. 108]. (2)


Note
(1) In 1939, Korzybski had taken up the idea (probably proposed by M. Kendig, his 'right hand woman' at the Institute of General Semantics) to invite a group of well-known academics, professionals, government officials, etc., to have their names associated with Korzybski as "Honorary Trustees" of the Institute of General Semantics and thus to express their support of the aims and program of the Institute. Honorary Trustees had no official duties.

(2) You can link here to the earlier (1953) J. Samuel Bois translation of Bachelard's full discussion of Korzybski and His Work in The Philosophy of No. The Bois translation appeared in General Semantics Bulletin 12 & 13.