Showing posts with label Chapter 33 - First Draft. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chapter 33 - First Draft. Show all posts

Thursday, December 11, 2014

Chapter 33 - First Draft: Part 4 - Badly Overdue

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)
Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 
All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

By the end of 1927, Korzybski was approaching a deep sense of hopelessness. His work had become both a blessing and a curse. Many areas of science and life seemed to be moving in a non-aristotelian direction. An explicit non-aristotelian system seemed to him necessary for someone to formulate. The existence of such a system might help quicken the otherwise more-or-less unconscious non-aristotelian tendencies in the culture. Alfred had started to produce such a system. If he was going to continue, he wanted to do as good a job as possible. But he truly didn’t know whether he was up to it. 

The book was already badly overdue. Yet his notes and writing were still in a jumble, cut into pieces that he was sorting into boxes, trying to put into a better order.(30) His project seemed like madness! Who but a madman would try to study and integrate such an abundance of diverse material? One man could not reasonably hope to master even a small portion of it. Seeking to show the connections amongst a multitude of different fields, he needed help not only in checking the separate specialty areas he referred to, but also in assessing his general system. Knowing how easy it could be to make things fit an unsound theory, he still did not entirely trust his own judgment. He was consulting with Graven, who was in the process of gathering clinical data to write up along with a psychiatry appendix. Alfred was also accumulating a number of other expert specialists willing to look at various parts of the book that touched upon their fields. Still he had no one who seemed both willing and able to competently evaluate the whole. Keyser might be one of the few who could do so, but Alfred did not want to burden his friend with too much at this point. Keyser seemed to have bounced back from Ella Keyser’s death, but his health seemed delicate and he had to garner his limited energies for his own writing and teaching. Meanwhile, every blessedly cursed day brought forth more material (not just from physics) that Alfred felt compelled to deal with. Bridgman was by no means the only one who could smell something in the air.


Some of what Korzybski was reading, circa 1927, all grist for the mill for Science and Sanity

For example, over the last year in conjunction with his work with Graven, Alfred had been digging more deeply into the psychiatric literature, especially Sigmund Freud’s work in English translation. In his most recent books, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and The Ego and the Id, Freud seemed to Korzybski to be getting close to the formulation of the “scientific unconscious” as elaborated in the second Time-Binding paper. Alfred considered Freud’s work valuable in many ways. Indeed, he would put Freud on the list of those to whom he would dedicate his book. But even in 1927, he found Freud’s language “very cloudy”. As Alfred wrote to Roy Haywood in early 1928, “his [Freud’s] formulations are not workable.”(31)

Alfred had also already begun corresponding with Trigant Burrow (1875–1950), a psychiatrist who, in 1927, had just come out with his first book, The Social Basis of Consciousness. Alfred also corresponded with Burrow’s colleague, psychiatrist Hans Syz. Although Burrow had had an early interest in Freud’s work and psychoanalysis, he had been forming his own views outside of the main psychoanalytical circles. Beside his M.D., he had gotten a doctorate in experimental psychology focused on the physiology of attention. His approach to therapy—he pioneered in group therapy and social psychiatry—developed out of his interest in the interactions among the physiological, phenomenological, interpersonal, and socio-cultural aspects of maladjustment. Burrow may have coined the word “neurodynamic” (he was one of the first to use the term) and went on to explore the role of attention and symbolism in neuroses.

Burrow had independently gotten very close to a great deal of what Korzybski had formulated in his general theory. Korzybski sought to emphasize the commonality of their work. But Burrow’s understanding seemed intuitive, his language cloudy. Alfred had hopes his own work could suggest ways to bring greater formulational clarity to Burrow’s efforts. Burrow didn’t see it that way. In his book, Science and Man’s Behavior, published posthumously, Burrow wrote:
I would not make all this ado about the wide disparity between…[us], were not Korzybski so determined to proselytize me on the ground that “we are saying the same thing.” Perhaps we are. But do our organisms feel the same way? (32) 

Regarding Burrow, Korzybski in later years didn’t waver from the opinion he expressed to Roy Haywood in early 1928, “His [Burrow’s] main thesis is that we are all insane (neurotics), do not know it and are headed for worse. I quite agree with him.”(33)  

The kinds of works that appealed to Korzybski, as grist for his mill, tended to share some common characteristics, no matter what their subject area. First, they were apt to have what he called a behaviouristic outlook (not the same as ‘behaviorism’). Even in a ‘seemingly’ esoteric work in mathematics or physics, he looked for some acknowledgment on the author’s part that knowledge, expressed through some form of language and symbolism, never ‘dropped down from the heavens’—some humans produced it. And the process involved in developing-expressing knowledge made a difference to the knowledge produced. Acknowledgement of that, a nascent consciousness of abstracting, made a difference too.

Second, the works that especially called to Korzybski were likely to have a comprehensive viewpoint. To show important relationships often required bursting through the limiting box of any particular discipline or school of thought. Such working non-elementalism also tended to involve cautiousness about additive, linear approaches involving relationships among elements. ‘Adding’ a new element or elements could often lead to complex, non-additive results, e.g., one more guest at a party could create multiple complications. The problems of aristotelian “plus” approaches to non-linear, ‘non-plus’ situations had been bugging Korzybski since the early twenties when he had started his explorations in mathematical logic. The non-elementalistic issue of non-additivity/non-linearity had many theoretical and practical ramifications. Rainich had been helping him to tackle the issue on the math and physics side and he was looking for literature that would provide more examples of non-additivity in different disciplines and in daily life.

Third, the works Korzybski found most compelling were likely to show a dynamic attitude, dealing with their subjects in historical, process terms. The significance of space-time factors in understanding any matter of consideration could not be underestimated, as far as Korzybski was concerned. Any of the three above-mentioned characteristics would, at the very least, give someone’s work a non-aristotelian direction.

Korzybski had been reading one just-published book, which had all three characteristics—Thought and the Brain, by French experimental psychologist Henri PiĆ©ron (1881–1964). Especially after he started reading neurologist C. Judson Herrick’s writings about a year before, Alfred had more than ever been emphasizing abstracting as a psycho-physiological, neurological process (which did not eliminate the data of introspection). The lower order(s) of abstracting (non-verbal) related closely to activity in the sub-cortical areas (the thalamus, etc.) that Herrick had written about. They heavily involved the ‘affective’, ‘feeling’ aspect of people’s reactions.

Both Pieron’s work and that of Dr. Lewis R. Yealland as represented in his book Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, seemed especially relevant to understanding this ‘feeling’ aspect. Using a combination of electrical stimulation and verbal suggestion, Yealland had treated Great War soldiers suffering from various psycho-physiological consequences of “shell shock”. Yealland’s reputation would later suffer (he was depicted as a villain in novelist Pat Barker’s late 20th century fictional account of British World War I soldiers, Regeneration). However, the apparent effectiveness of Yealland’s methods impressed Korzybski. Korzybski had also become interested in the psycho-galvanic skin response (the basis of the psycho-galvanometer or “lie detector” machine) that both Hans Syz and physiologist H. B. Williams at Columbia were studying. (Alfred later recounted to his students his experiences as a test subject in Dr. William’s laboratory).

From these studies, it had become clear to Korzybski that despite the great importance of language, the linguistic levels of abstracting were, in some sense, only accessory to the more dynamic, non-verbal, affective, lower-order level(s). As he wrote to Graven in October, 1927, he saw that these lower levels could and needed to be used in psychotherapy (34): “If we stimulate by ANY MEANS whatsoever the “attention”, we mobilize or even produce an energetic tention and so later we can direct the discharge of this energy in desired channels, beneficial results follow.”(35) Although he was giving advice to Graven about working with patients, the recommendation ‘to interest attention by any means’ also reflected Korzybski’s developing views on how to communicate and teach: for greatest effectiveness, the non-verbal level of abstraction needed to be used to the maximum—together with the verbal.(36) 

Beside the physics, psychiatry and neurology books, Alfred was also reading the first volume of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, which had come out in English translation in 1926. (He would read the second volume after its publication in 1928.) As Alfred later wrote, he found The Decline of the West, “unique and astonishing.”(37) Indeed, his dark mood lightened a bit as a result of reading it in the fall of 1927. As he wrote to Florian Cajori in September:
….I was very lonesome in my work. I treat mathematics from a neglected point of view namely as a form of human behavior, an attitude which seems legitimate at least. I was so glad to find lately that I am not alone and that Spengler in his Decline of the West is also doing it. I just began to read this book a second time and find that he traces in the development of mathematics the expression of the spirit of [its] time. (38)

Given Spengler’s main thesis—a variation on the theme of “logical destiny”—and the erudition with which he elaborated upon it, Korzybski’s high estimation of The Decline of the West doesn’t seem surprising. Richard J. Robertson later noted that for Spengler,
…The “mechanism”, of history…is not physical law but destiny; that is, the playing out of consequences drawn from initial premises, as in systems of mathematics. [Spengler] made it his task, then, to outline the principles underlying the “spirit” of different cultures and detail what he saw as the evidence for them. (39)

For Spengler, this playing out of cultural premises/assumptions meant the inevitable decline of a civilization. To him, Western Civilization was already unraveling with no way out except for Mankind to continue going around in ultimately fruitless circles. Korzybski felt this profound pessimism about the future seemed justified—but only if humans could not transcend their old ways of unconscious development. As he would soon write, The Decline of the West provided “a great description of the childhood of humanity”.(40) What appeared like a circle might then form a spiral path forward and upward toward genuine human progress. He believed his own work could help this movement. But he had to get the first draft done.



Notes 
You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 
30. AK to Sally Avery, 10/31/1927. AKDA 20.738.

31. AK to H. L. Haywood, 1/2/1928. AKDA 21.571. 

32. Burrow 1953, p. 295. 

33. AK to H. L. Haywood, 1/2/1928. AKDA 21.571. 

34. AK to Philip S. Graven, 10/20/1927. AKDA 20.720. “I wrote to you some time ago asking about the psychogalvanic experiments. Did you put your hands on it? I have a very definite feeling that there is a great deal which could be done by improving the psychoanalytical technique. See Pieron (Thought and the Brain) particularly part IV the affective regulation of mental life, its role and mechanism. There you will find a definite energetic treatment (he does not connect it with psychoanalysis, this connection is mine). He ascribes to attention definite energetic characteristics, quite justly I think. This of course is strictly connected with transfer [transference ?].” 

35. Ibid. 

36. “The main point is to interest “attention” by any means and this is why we should resort to every possible instrument, which is always a lower order abstraction, and therefore affecting lower centers, and acting by lower centers and so having maximum effect on the thalamus etc and the affective. This is why I suggested Blackboards, toys etc. Now I go further and suggest galvanometers, MIRRORS and even electrical treatment.” [Ibid.] 

37. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 47. 

38. AK to Florian Cajori, 9/25/27. AKDA 20.661. 

39. Robertson, p. 101. 

40. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 49.



Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Chapter 33 - First Draft: Part 3 - Quantum Differences

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)
Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 
All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

Thus began the at-times difficult friendship of Korzybski and Bridgman. As they came to know each other better, both men communicated with unfailing directness and honesty. In addition to their correspondence, they met face-to-face a number of times. While maintaining the utmost civility, by 1934 (a year after Korzybski’s book was finally published) their differences had become acute. But in the early phase of their relationship, Bridgman found Korzybski’s work intriguing and quickly offered to read Alfred’s developing manuscript and to help him in any other way he could. Over the next few years, he generously did so. Alfred felt much in debt to Bridgman for suggesting things to read, editing the book (particularly the mathematics and physics sections), and providing general criticism. 

Although Bridgman had some minor suggestions, he never had any significant objections to Alfred’s writing about physics. Indeed, one year later as he worked on editing the manuscript, Bridgman seemed astounded by Korzybski’s grasp of the major new developments in the science: “I was much impressed by your chapter on the new wave mechanics; how do you manage to read so widely and digest so much? Many of your points of view I found interesting for their physical suggestiveness, apart from the special use that you make of them.”(18)

Bridgman was also responsible for one of the new terms Alfred later introduced in Science and Sanity. Alfred was looking for a better term than “operational”, “behaviouristic”, or even “functional” (in the sense of “what something is doing”) for the broad attitudinal perspective that he saw both he and Bridgman trying to formulate, each in his own way. Sometime over the next few years, Bridgman suggested the term “actional”, which Alfred used in the book along with the other three terms. After 
Science and Sanity was published, Alfred realized he already had a better term but had not recognized it at the time—“extensional”.

Bridgman’s main objections to Korzybski’s work related not to the physics background but to some of Alfred’s non-aristotelian formulations. Although, for the most part, Alfred considered these objections wrong-headed, he still appreciated the scientist’s fierce New England independence and unrestrained honesty—up to a point.

Although Bridgman had indicated his general agreement with the content of the two Time-Binding papers, he had wanted to learn more about the Anthropometer. About a month later Korzybski sent him one. Bridgman felt “grateful to accept it”, writing to Alfred, “I shall keep it where I can often see it, and perhaps my thinking also will be wonderfully improved.”
Your letter contains many interesting and suggestive points which would require long personal discussion to treat at all adequately. There are still many difficulties for me in applying the A. to all my mental processes…The event…is the starting point for us, and it is of necessity something that we think about. But we must not think about it in words, for the moment anything verbal gets into our thinking we descend from the level of the event. (19) 
Bridgman seemed to imply here that he could experience his non-verbal ‘thinking’,‘perceiving’, etc., directly on the level of ‘the event’ itself. But according to the distinctions represented by Korzybski on the Anthropometer, whatever Bridgman or anyone else ‘thought’ non-verbally still had to be allocated—not to the event level—but rather to the ‘object’ level as a first-order, neurological abstraction from the event. And ‘the event’, for Korzybski, could only be inferred and definitely required symbolism and words (the accumulated science-at-a-given-date) to know anything about it. We were always ‘in’ the event, but any level of experience/knowledge of it always consisted of some abstraction from it.

Alfred’s reply to Bridgman’s concerns, written a few days later, seemed rather mild. Bridgman seemed assuaged by his reply. At least he made no further mention of the issue in his next letter to Alfred. But his perplexities about the Anthropometer and Korzybski’s formulations continued to brew. Probably during one of their face-to-face conferences (either in 1930, when Alfred visited Bridgman and others at Harvard, or in 1931, when the two men both attended a AAAS meeting in New Orleans) “a dramatic moment” occurred which Alfred wrote about in Science and Sanity:
...I had a very helpful and friendly contact prolonged over a number of years with a very eminent scientist. After many discussions, I asked if some of the special points of my work were clear to him. His answer was, ‘Yes, it is all right, and so on, but, how can you expect me to follow your work all through, if I still do not know what an object is?’ It was a genuine shock to me… The definite answer may be expressed as follows: ‘Say whatever you choose about the object, and whatever you might say is not it.’ Or, in other words : ‘Whatever you might say the object “is”, well it is not .’ This negative statement is final, because it is negative. (20)
Examination of his extensive correspondence with Bridgman on this very topic, leaves little doubt as to which “eminent scientist” Korzybski was referring to here.

By 1934, Alfred had begun to lose patience with Bridgman in regard to a number of issues. Despite their commonalities (which Alfred had seen and had sought to bridge), what put the two men at odds could be seen in their different attitudes towards the new developments in quantum physics in 1927 and afterwards. As Korzybski related early on to Bridgman, he was ready for the new. In particular, he welcomed the developments in quantum physics, which he had started to study and which seemed to fully jibe with his understanding of the non-aristotelian viewpoint. Indeed, it seemed to him that his educational methods to promote consciousness of abstracting could help people to understand and explore the quantum realm more easily:
...As yet we do not approach the Q. [quantum realm] with enough psychological freedom from macroscopic old prejudices expressed in the machinery of our forms of representations...I see no reason why we could not...free ourselves psychologically from the bondage of the old form of representations, and see the old facts of the Q.t. which we know already and make a happier form of representation. (21) 

In contrast, in 1927 (and for a long time afterwards), Bridgman seemed to look at these developments with a tinge of regret for an earlier time when ‘reality’ had seemed as solid as a brick. His “blockage about the ‘object’ ” seemed rather stubborn, despite his intellectual understanding that the underlying ‘reality’ postulated by quantum theory was not anything like a brick but rather more like a ‘mad dance’ (to use one of Alfred’s favorite metaphors), where even the classical notion of causality had come into question. 
Tracks of Neutrinos (Based on Fermilab Bubble Chamber Image

Bridgman wrote to Korzybski early in 1928: “Your remarks about the pathological aspects of not knowing were very interesting. I suppose perhaps that when one knows that he doesn’t know the state is the most pathological; this would seem to be suggested by the constant headache, which I have when trying to get the new quantum mechanics.”(22) Bridgman seemed to fear that Heisenberg’s “principle of indetermination”, as he called it, threatened meaninglessness in the realm of the very small.(23) Korzybski did sympathize with Bridgman’s sentiment that “part of the causality concept is conditioned by our own thinking mechanism so that we can never entirely get away from it.”(24) Still, the new view didn’t give Alfred a headache; he relished it and the possibility of an altered notion of causality.(25) For Korzybski, the most pathological aspect of not knowing resulted from not knowing that one doesn’t know (and from the “false knowledge” tending to fill the ‘vacuum’).

Alas for Alfred, by 1934 cooperation with Bridgman no longer seemed possible. Bridgman felt at odds with Korzybski, had significant disagreements with some of the basic formulations (as he understood them) in Alfred’s book, and felt little to no interest in any more joining of hands. Although the men had some further correspondence, it seems to have petered out after 1936 when Bridgman sent a copy of his just-published book, The Nature of Physical Theory, to Korzybski.
Bridgman mistakenly understood Korzybski as wanting to make the structure of language ‘identical’ with experience. In the 1936 book, (without mentioning Korzybski by name), Bridgman condemned this [pp. 21-26]. Rightly so, but it had nothing to do with Korzybski’s actual views. Alfred wrote back to Bridgman in a 5-page letter with lengthy commentary—not entirely critical. Alfred had read the book with great interest and could see in it a profound ambivalence about his work. Alfred still cherished Bridgman’s friendship and seems to have hoped he could thrash things out with him.(26) Bridgman wasn’t willing and replied dismissively:
Now I have spent a great deal of time first and last on going over your ideas, as much as I am willing to afford in view of all my other interests, and the plain fact of the matter is that you haven’t ‘put it across’ as far as I am concerned. (27) 

Bridgman’s “struggles” and “ambivalence toward changing scientific standards”(28)—perhaps accelerated by his contact with Korzybski—continued until the end of his life. Ironically, The Way Things Are (1959), one of Bridgman’s last books, shows a startlingly significant, though apparently unconscious, korzybskian influence. Although Bridgman seemed unaware of it, Alfred had managed to ‘put across’quite a bit.(29)



Notes 
You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 
18. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 11/18/1928. AKDA 21.281. 

19. P. W. Bridgman to AK 9/24/1927. AKDA 19.62. 

20. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 35.

21. AK to P. W. Bridgman, 9/26/1927. AKDA 20.665. 

22. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 1/29/1928. AKDA 21.29. 

23. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 3/18/1928. AKDA 21.113. 

24. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 1/29/1928. AKDA 21.29.

25. AK to P. W. Bridgman, 3/28/1928. AKDA 21.795. 

26. AK to P. W. Bridgman, 5/15/1936. IGS Archives.

27. P. W. Bridgman to Korzybski, May 31, 1936, qtd. in Walter, p. 155. 

28. Walter, p. 197. 

29. The Way Things Are clearly demonstrates Bridgman’s assimilation of much of what Korzybski conveyed to him during the period of their active association and correspondence. Nonetheless, Bridgman’s single, brief ‘put-down’ comment about Korzybski’s work in that book [Bridgman 1959, p. 33] shows his continued conscious misapprehension of it. Bridgman’s failure to appreciate what he got from his friend Alfred provides a prototypical example of what Korzybski called “the tragedy of his work”. [See Lucier.]


< Part 2      Part 4 >

Chapter 33 - First Draft: Part 2 - The Logic of Modern Physics

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)
Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 
All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

Among his new correspondents was Percy Williams Bridgman (1882–1961), a specialist in high-pressure physics who would eventually receive the 1946 Nobel Physics Prize for his work. Bridgman, who spent his entire professional career at Harvard, was also struggling to make sense of both relativity theory and “the new quantum messes”. Very much a practical experimentalist, he described himself to Korzybski as “one of those dirty physicists, all of whose time is occupied with the highly unabstract work of discovering whiskers on the suspensions of galvanometers or rubbing dirt from electrical contacts.”(9) However, what immediately attracted Korzybski’s interest in Bridgman was the physicist’s theoretical foray into scientific methodology with his book, published earlier in 1927, The Logic of Modern Physics. In it, Bridgman introduced the notion of “the operational point of view” to understand scientific formulating (this was called “operationism” or “operationalism” by others). Bridgman wrote: “In general we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.”(10) 
Percy William Bridgman (1946)

Echoing Mach’s positivism and Peirce’s pragmatism, Bridgman was attempting to ‘clean house’ in physics, to sweep away the cobwebs of “meaningless questions” which threatened to stall further progress in the science. While focusing on physics, Bridgman acknowledged the possibility of applying this approach to moral, philosophical, and social questions as well. The book would go on to have a major influence on psychology and the social sciences by means of the notion of the “operational definition”.

In early July 1927 after reading 
The Logic of Modern Physics, Alfred wrote to Keyser and noted some of his problems with it. Nonetheless, Alfred was not inclined to focus on the flaws of Bridgman’s work. As he told Keyser, “The book is an important event in my private life.”(11) He was soon enthusiastically recommending it to others. More than anything else, The Logic of Modern Physics appealed to Korzybski because Bridgman’s operational approach—in however limited a way—partook in the kind of “behaviouristic” attitude Alfred had found so fruitful in his own work. This was not to be confused with the narrow psychological ‘behaviorism’ of people like John Watson, but rather resulted from looking at all fields of knowledge—mathematics and physics included—as forms of human behavior and language.

Korzybski saw 
The Logic of Modern Physics as one of the first attempts by a working scientist to focus specifically on scientific method, especially in terms of this behaviouristic attitude. Alfred felt this attitude lay behind Einstein’s achievements. Reading Bridgman helped Alfred to clarify the methodological nature of his own work. As he later put it:
...What Bridgman calls operational method, is exactly the method that was introduced by Einstein, but not formulated by Einstein as a method...[and] is an independent discovery. It is a further abstraction methodologically which Einstein [was] unaware of. (12) 

Alfred saw his own independently developed work as more comprehensive—in terms of method—than that of either man. Einstein, not totally unaware of his own methods, wrote in a later ‘philosophical’ moment: “The whole of science is nothing more than the refinement of every day thinking.”(13) As Korzybski saw it in 1927, Bridgman had pulled out a significant aspect of Einstein’s particular “refinements” and their implications for physics. Korzybski, abstracting further, was coming around full circle by seeking to bring back this and other methodological refinements into everyday ‘thinking’ and living.

As background to his ‘childishly simple’ applications of physico-mathematical methods for daily life, Korzybski wanted his book to include, among other things, an accurate account of the worldview and epistemology of the latest physics. Perhaps Bridgman, given his methodological interests, would be willing to serve as one of Alfred’s expert scientific manuscript readers. Even more, perhaps Bridgman might be open to allying himself with Alfred.

Throughout the years, Alfred had seen his scientific program—developing a science of man and a non-aristotelian revision of human knowledge—as a group enterprise. (For example, he had shelved, but not abandoned, the notion of having something like the Library of Human Engineering.) He really did not want to be working alone. Indeed, he didn’t feel one man could adequately perform the necessary and ongoing tasks of scientific synthesis and non-aristotelian research and development. At this stage of the enterprise, the enormous individual effort he was making to write the book seemed necessary—like the task of lifting the artillery piece by himself on the road from Lodz—if only because he saw the ‘path’ of inquiry ‘blocked’ and in need of clearing, and he couldn’t see anyone else who was doing it. (Perhaps with helpers like Bridgman, he might at least not get a formulational hernia from the strain.) Once the path had been cleared, others could travel alongside and perhaps even move ahead of him.

Over the years he had tried to get the interest of various people like C.K. Ogden, whom he had thought might closely sympathize with his goals, to work cooperatively with him. But, although he had gotten help from some, he found that most either had different goals and/or different views of cooperation—or were just too busy with their own work. He was prepared for a similar response from Bridgman. But it surely seemed worthwhile to contact him and feel him out for the possibility of getting help (he was certainly willing to help Bridgman as well, if he could). Carmichael and Keyser had both read Bridgman’s book and generally agreed with Alfred’s assessment of it. Keyser wrote to Alfred, “I’m giving myself the pleasure of sending your monographs [the Time-Binding papers] to Bridgman with a note suggesting that he may find them worthy of attentive reading. God only knows what the effect will be but it may be that God will never tell.”(14) 

A few days later, Bridgman wrote back to Keyser:
...I fussed over the manuscript of the thing [The Logic of Modern Physics] so long that I ended by wondering whether I was really saying anything of note; it is a great relief to know that you have found it suggestive. 
The monographs of Korzybski have not yet come. I shall be interested to see them and am grateful to you for sending them. (15) 

Keyser shared the letter with Alfred, who wrote back to him on July 22:
I think I understand his troubles, lack of language, lack of scientific psychology, scientific logic, and scientific philosophy, that’s what bothers him. Can I understand him? By Jove I can. I hope he will understand me…(16) 

Korzybski wrote his first letter to Bridgman on July 18 with much appreciation and some mild criticism. Bridgman, then at his summer home in Randolph, New Hampshire, replied on July 24:
I am very much obliged indeed for your note of appreciation about my book. I shall be much interested to receive your reprints when they are available. Although I realized that our present habits of thought left much room for improvement, it had never occurred to me that psychopathic cases might be improved merely by improving habits of thought.  
With regard to the defects in the book,...I would be most grateful to you, if some time you could spare some of your leisure to let me know in some detail what have struck you as the most serious defects. 
Most sincerely,
P. W. Bridgman (17)   

Notes 
You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 
9. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 11/13/1927. AKDA 21.13. 

10. Bridgman 1927, p. 5. 

11. AK to C. J. Keyser, 7/9/1927. AKDA 20.541.

12. Korzybski 1947, p. 48. 

13. “Physics and Reality” in Einstein 2000, p. 247. 

14. C. J. Keyser to AK, 7/13/1927. AKDA 19.16. 

15. P. W. Bridgman to C. J. Keyser, 7/18/1927. AKDA 19.2. 

16. AK to C. J. Keyser, 7/22/1927. AKDA 20.557. 

17. P. W. Bridgman to AK, 7/24/1927. AKDA 19.28.



< Part 1      Part 3 >

Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Chapter 33 - First Draft: Part 1 - Introduction

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)
Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 
All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

“When the first draft is done the back of the job is broken.”(1) Korzybski would have agreed with the maxim. But getting the first draft done had turned into a monumental struggle. As the summer of 1927 slipped into autumn, he was wondering whether he or the job of the book would ‘surrender’ first. Alfred wrote to E.T. Bell in Pasadena, “As to my book, I [am] working like mad...if I do not get it out of my system pretty soon it will break me.”(2) 

At least he had a “quiet and nice” place in which to work. Alfred and Mira’s penthouse studio apartment in the large, old-fashioned house at 321 Carlton Avenue in Brooklyn, convenient to New York City subway lines, consisted of one big room “like a barn” which gave the two of them plenty of space. It had a kitchen area as well as “a bath, closets, a garret and a private roof garden.”(3) The metal and glass skylight helped illuminate the apartment and also contributed to the fact that, as he later noted, they “roasted in summer” and were “freezing in winter”.(4) Although both Alfred and Mira would spend significant periods of time away from it, the Brooklyn apartment remained their home until 1936.  
Alfred Korzybski on his roof at 321 Carlton Ave., Brooklyn, New York

In the fall of 1927, they had settled into the “uneventful” existence, which would typify their years in Brooklyn. As he described their daily routine of the time, he and Mira were “up at 7. I prepare the breakfast, as usual, bring the papers and mail as usual, and again as usual go to my desk and work all day until late at night, day in and day out, I go very seldom out.”(5) Mira had spent the summer in the Hamptons on Long Island trying to get painting commissions. The failure of her campaign had left their working funds extremely low. Since they didn’t want to touch their ‘sacred’ savings account money, Alfred felt forced to ask both Roy Haywood and Calvin Bridges for loans to help tide them over. Neither of his friends had spare cash to lend. He and Mira were just going to have to tighten their belts for a while. Mira was probably going to have to go out soon and do some more traveling to get jobs. Meanwhile, Alfred’s book appeared a long way from finished.

Alfred’s voluminous correspondence vouched for the fact that he could spit out words with ease. Also, when he had to, he could produce a polished piece of writing for a deadline. Jesse Lee Bennett had asked him to write a review of Keyser’s new book, Mole Philosophy and Other Essays for the July issue of his magazine The Modern World. Even with the tumult of the Houck business and the move to Brooklyn barely behind him, Alfred had come through on time with the review.

No, the slowness of the book writing came from the intrinsic difficulty of the task he had set for himself: to formulate a methodological synthesis of human knowledge circa-1927, broadly applicable to science and everyday life. He was continuing to accumulate more material, which seemed essential to his enterprise. Half in delight and half in despair, he wrote to William Alanson White that “new scientific books in every field seem to support my work, but I must stop reading and devote more time to writing as there seem[s] to be no end to it.”(6) The despair seemed to outweigh the delight; in a letter he wrote to Bell:
The slowness with which my book progresses is maddening, the more that every new neurological discovery comes beautifully my way, and also other discoveries, I still have nothing to retract but just amplify, and by Jove if I do not stop somewhere the damned book will never be published. The newer quantum messes are coming in and I do not dare even look at them. (7) 
But look at them he did. The letter to Bell continued. “Do you know the papers of Heisenberg…on the phenomenological aspects of quantum theory, Carl Eckert[‘s] Operator Calculus…and Schrodinger’s Undulatory [wave] theory mechanics…What do you think of it? ”(8) Alfred also wanted Bell’s opinion about the work of Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer and his colleague, German mathematician, Hermann Weyl. Brouwer had developed an approach called “intuitionism” which seemed to take a non-elementalistic, human behavior approach towards the foundations of mathematics. This, and Brouwer’s questioning of the “law of excluded middle”, definitely gave his work a non-aristotelian thrust that Alfred found promising. In addition to Bell, Alfred was reaching out to other mathematicians and physicists whom he hoped could help him understand these latest developments.


Notes 
You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 
1. Barzun and Graff, p. 384. 

2. AK to E. T. Bell, 8/24/1927. AKDA 20.608. 

3. AK to H. S. Sullivan, 10/9/1927. AKDA 20.699. 

4. Korzybski 1947, p. 269. 

5. AK to Sally Avery, 10/13/1927. AKDA 20.704. 

6. AK to W. A. White, 9/28/1927. AKDA 20.667. 

7. AK to E. T. Bell, 10/20/1927, AKDA 20.723.