Chapter 38 - "General Semantics": Part 4 - "Won't you have a seat?'

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)

Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 

All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

The AAAS meeting would run from December 28, 1931 until January 2, 1932. Alfred had hoped to give two, or even three, presentations of his work if he could: one to the AAAS Psychology Section, under the title “A Non-Aristotelian System. A General Introduction to a Theory of Sanity”; one to the Medical Section, on “A Psycho-Physiological Theory of Sanity and its Dependence on Physico-mathematical Sciences”; and one at the joint meeting of the AAAS Mathematics Section and the American Mathematical Society. Basically he planned to write one paper, which he could then modify according to the audience. But he was too late submitting his titles and abstracts to the Psychology and Medical sections. So he ended up with just one paper to give on the subject of “A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics and Physics”. Although he had anticipated it would take only a few days to write, it actually took him three weeks. He sent advance copies of the manuscript to a number of mathematicians, some of whom would be attending the conference. The paper, a sharp summary of his work, would later appear as Supplement III of Korzybski’s book. His abstract, published the following year in the Bulletin of The American Mathematical Society, read as follows: 

This paper gives an anthropological approach to the subject. Identity, a fundamental, false to fact, postulate of the aristotelian trilogy (the aristotelian, euclidean, newtonian systems), establishes elementalism; an non-aristotelian system rejects “identity,” becomes non-elementalistic. The inter-relation between the non-aristotelian, non-euclidean, non-newtonian systems (called non-systems) is given, also the essential differentiation between the un-speakable objective levels (ordinary objects, processes, action, functionings, immediate feelings, etc.) and verbal levels, establishing structure, defined in terms of relations or multi-dimensional order, as the only link between the two worlds. Structure becomes the only content of “knowledge.” Semantic definition of number and mathematics in terms of relations explains why mathematics gives structure-knowledge. There is one name for happenings on the un-speakable levels and “mental pictures,” a partial mechanism of identification. The two-valued aristotelian logic is a limiting case of a general many-valued logic of probability. Two-valued logic does not apply to processes, the objective world, the foundation of mathematics, the theory of infinity, etc. The many-valued logic covers all 1931 human needs, mathematics and mathematical physics included. (Received November 27, 1931) (17) 

The last time he had traveled to New Orleans (on the way to Pasadena in 1928), Korzybski had taken a boat. He had found the trip inexpensive and relaxing and he decided to travel that way again to the conference at the end of December 1931. On board he had an experience, which he related in the book (p. 423–424) and later recounted in seminars and in 1947 when he was recording his memoirs:

I deliberately wanted to be alone and have peace for three, four days, so I went by ship from New York. Deliberately. Left alone and rest. And on the ship I had the differential in my cabin. And I happened to have a card table, a ship card table, perfectly lousy, ricky, ricky [rickety], and I had a ship chair, complete wreck. Merely stuck together somehow. I had to be very careful with the table and with the chair. But we went along somehow.

Once a fellow sufferer of the ship visited my room. Oh he was sitting on my berth, and I was sitting on the chair, and he asked “What is the differential?” I tried to explain to him. This actually happened. And I was performing by extension. I show, never mind talking, I show. The fellow is sitting on my bed. I went to the door and I pretended, I come in and the visitor tells me—this is all pretending, playing a game—“Won’t you have a seat?” Now I am explaining to him in the meantime. I say, ‘If I take your word as an actuality the seat, the chair, then…if I take your word as granted, I will sit on the chair, the word chair, with great security no matter what the damn thing is. Chair is a perfectly good solid word, so I sit on the word with great security.

Intensional Smith1
Watercolor and Ink drawing for Korzybski by A.B. Stewart, 1940 

In the meantime, I was standing, speaking that way, shaking, literally shaking the chair. The chair was falling apart. One of those ship chairs. Few wooden pieces somehow connected and some canvases. You know that kind of stuff. Very flimsy. The chair was falling apart and the chair was already a derelict without my knowledge. And then big, loud, with energy, I said, “And then if I sit with great security on the word…,” and I actually with great elegance sat on the derelict which collapsed underneath. Completely collapsed. The table, you see, was so lousy that I couldn’t even get out of the chair.

What happened? Did I fall down? Unconsciously I didn’t trust the chair. I didn’t sit down on the term there. I was sitting on an actual silent level business. Instinctively I didn’t trust and I didn’t fall down. In the meantime, say if I had fallen down, even if I would have been hurt, I would not be frightened.  

The frightened business is worse than the hurt. Experiences of the war, for instance, show that. If a soldier gets a big fright unexpectedly, he may break down. If he expects horror and gets that, he does not break down, and there’s another thing. You know from the first war and has probably been verified in this war [World War II]—psychiatry reports on that. If the fellow is wounded, he does not break down mentally because he is too busy suffering physically. He hasn’t time for elaboration. These are extremely important things and with me, I am cautious without being conscious of it. The best example I can give is that chair on the ship. I had thousands of cases like that of my own during a lifetime. [He went on to recall some of his ‘Oh, how extraordinary!’ moments as a young man.] Yes, how extraordinary. It’s a delayed reaction all right. …if you get the feel no matter what happens [that] you are observing, ‘oh, that’s what happens,’ ‘oh, quite interesting.’ (18) 

In New Orleans he saw Bridgman, who had been invited to give that year’s keynote Willard Gibbs Lecture, at some joint sessions the Mathematical Society had with the American Physical Society. Alfred also saw Birkhoff, Bell, and Carmichael (who had all read his paper ahead of time), and a number of other mathematicians he knew. They attended his 15 minute talk. Alfred considered his “not too rotten presentation” well received. However, after his talk a Jesuit professor of mathematics came up to him and told him that,

…I destroy the very foundation of ‘religion’ and I should abandon it or I will get in trouble with the church and get on the index. Among others he said “You certainly will not deny that everything is identical with itself.” I asked him if he ever heard of modern physics, and as he admitted that he teaches it, I said “I certainly will deny that a submicroscopic process is ever ‘identical’ with itself.” He said nothing to that, but on his face he exhibited the most bewildered and horrified attitude. (19) 

Korzybski may have actually agreed with the Jesuit mathematician that the foundation of ‘religion’, or at least Catholicism 1931, was incompatable with his non-aristotelian views. He would have had to modify this opinion at least a bit if he had been able to see the work of Bernard Lonergan, a Jesuit whose major work Insight, was published in 1957. Lonergan brought an appreciation of modern scientific method into Catholic philosophy. Korzybski would surely not have disagreed entirely with Lonergan’s statement from that book: “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.” (20)  The anti-clerical Korzybski was not going to abandon his work for fear of getting into trouble with the Catholic church. He had anticipated major opposition from there, but—as it turned out—his main opposition came from another quarter—some quite ‘irreligious’ intellectuals, philosophers, and scientific spokesmen whose ‘idols’ his work would threaten.

Notes 

You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 

17. Abstract of “A non-aristotelian system and its necessity for rigor in mathematics and physics”. Bulletin of The American Mathematical Society, Vol. 38 (1932), p. 36. Reprinted in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 182. 

18. Korzybski 1947, pp. 405-408. 

19. AK to W.M. Wheeler, 7/16/1933. AKDA 24.78. 

20. Lonergan, p. xxviii.

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Chapter 38 - "General Semantics": Part 3 - "A theory of 'meaning' is impossible."

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)

Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 

All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

In the book, he had written a great deal about ‘meaning’ and of his own “non-elementalistic theory of meanings”.(10) But by the late 1930s, the conflation of his work with verbalistic “semantics” had become serious enough for him to begin to pull away from talking about his work in such terms: 

…a theory of ‘meaning’, or still worse, a theory of ‘meaning of meaning’, being verbalistic, must be elementalistic and non-similar in structure to the structure of the world and of ourselves.” (1938) (11)  

I introduced the term General Semantics to indicate a general theory of values, a general theory of evaluation of facts, relations, ‘feelings’, etc., not of meanings by mere verbal definition.” (1939) (12)

By 1941, he would devote several pages of his book’s “Introduction to the Second Edition” to “Perplexities in Theories of ‘Meaning’ ” noting their hopeless inadequacy. In 1942, in his “Foreword” with M. Kendig to A Theory of Meaning Analyzed, he would go further and decry,

…‘Cheshire Cat Theories of Meaning’. You know the cat with a head and no body which kept appearing and disappearing, and which Alice found quite bewildering, even in Wonderland. Something drastic must be done about ‘that cat’,...  

....General semantics formulates an empirical natural science based on the action and reaction of the human nervous system. It is a general theory of evaluation involving the nervous system-in-an-environment, and it has very little, if anything, to do with ‘meaning’ in the academic sense. (13) 

With this statement, he had indeed come to the point of doing something drastic. Over the next few years, the conflation of his work with linguistic semantics—especially by some of his ‘popularizers’—became a major irritant to him. As the Third Edition of his book was being prepared in 1947, Korzybski wrote a preface in which he attempted to separate his work from “semantics” and theories of ‘meaning’:

My work was developed entirely independently of ‘semantics’, ‘significs’, ‘semiotic’, ‘semasiology’, etc., although I know today and respect the works of the corresponding investigators in those fields, who explicitly state they do not deal with a general theory of values. Those works do not touch my field, and as my work progressed it has become obvious that a theory of ‘meaning’ is impossible…, and ‘significs’, etc., are unworkable. Had I not become acquainted with these accomplishments shortly before publication of this book, I would have labeled my work by another name, but the system would have remained fundamentally unaltered. (14) 

A theory of ‘meaning’ is impossible. Until the end of his life, he would continue to emphasize this point, in print and in his seminars and presentations. (15) He had long since stopped using the word ‘meaning’ without single quotes. He preferred using terms with more non-elementalistic associations like “orientations”, “methods”, and “evaluations” in discussing the issues he was dealing with in his work.

He also began to fully treat the term “semantic(s)” as the troublesome ‘trigger’ for misevaluating his work it had become. He had introduced the term “general semantics” to emphasize that his work constituted a theory of non-elementalistic evaluation. So, in “What I Believe”, a credo he wrote in 1948, he put “evaluational” in parentheses whenever he referred to “semantic (evaluational) reactions” or “neuro-semantic (evaluational) environments”. In his final paper, “The Role of Language in the Perceptual Processes”, which he was editing at the time his death, he made a further transition from this “evaluation in parentheses”. After introducing “semantic (evaluational) reaction”, “neuro-semantic (evaluational) environments”, etc.; he quickly switched to just writing about “evaluations”, “neuro-evaluational reactions”, “evaluational reactions”, “neuro-evaluational environments”, etc., for most of the rest of the paper. In this final work, he thus showed he didn’t need to use the term ‘semantic(s)’ in his serious formulating—despite the somewhat well-recognized name of his discipline by then (1950).

In his 1934-1935 “An Outline of General Semantics”, Korzybski would criticize the confused and self-contradictory uses of the term ‘identity’ in psychiatry, ‘philosophy’, ‘logic’, and mathematics. Ironically, the criticism turned out equally pertinent to the name he chose for his work and his initial attempt to extend ‘semantic(s)’ and ‘meaning’ to cover non-elementalistic evaluation:

...It is necessary to stress here, that it is an unreasonable practice and harmful to mankind, if specialists utilize a common term which implies humanly undesirable orientations, and make out of it a technical term, even if they give it a special meaning. Such unreasonable practices only introduce difficulties in human orientations, make the understanding of scientific issues difficult to the layman, and worst of all, this only facilitates harmful orientations. General Semantics suggests that specialists particularly should be more careful in their choice of common words for their technical terminology, because a technical definition will not alter the folk-meaning, and corresponding living human neuro-semantic reactions. In General Semantics the folk-meanings can no longer be neglected. (16) 

In his later work, Alfred did his best to follow this advice in relation to his own work and thus to correct his initial mistake of not doing so. To be charitable to Alfred, it seems well to remember something he sometimes said: ‘It’s damned difficult to talk sense.’ He never stopped revising his system and, at the time of his death, seemed well on the way to retiring “semantic reaction”. Perhaps if he had lived longer, the next step would have been to find another name for his system to replace “general semantics”. Certainly after his death, people’s automatic, undelayed reactions to the terms “general semantics” and “semantic reaction” became a neuro-evaluational obstacle for teachers of his work who were trying to convey his non-elementalistic approach to others.

But things looked different at the end of 1931. Alfred had just finished replenishing the manuscript with “semantic reactions”, “s.r”, etc. Various people were reading the manuscript and he had begun to get it professionally edited. The damned book did indeed seem ‘done’. Now he and Mira had to decide what to do about getting it into print. Meanwhile, he was ready to present his work to the world. He was writing a summary paper to present at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) winter meeting at Tulane University in New Orleans. He would go there to announce the birth of “general semantics”. 

Notes 

You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 

10. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 9.  

11. “General Semantics: Extensionalization in Mathematics, Mathematical Physics, and General Education. Paper II: Thalamic Symbolism and Mathematics”, in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 260. 

 12. “General Semantics and You”, in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 273. 

13. Korzybski (and M. Kendig, his coauthor here) provided a footnote for ‘Chesire Cat Theories of Meaning’*: “* To paraphrase Doctor Preston. See George H . Preston, Psychiatry for the Curious, Farrar & Rinehart, 1940, p. 7 ”, in “Foreword with M. Kendig, A Theory of Meaning Analyzed”. General Semantics Monographs, Number III (1942). Reprinted in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 371, p. 379. 

14. “Preface To The Third Edition”, in Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. xxxiv. 

15. See “Author’s Note” (1948) in Selections from Science and Sanity. Reprinted in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 620. 

16. “An Outline of General Semantics”, in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 204. 

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Chapter 38 - "General Semantics": Part 2 - A General Theory of Evaluation

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)

Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 

All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

Evaluation seemed like it would do the job since it implied some ‘cognitive’ effort connected with values. “Evaluation”, unlike “cognition”, non-elementalistically implied ‘feeling’ operating together with ‘thinking’. Korzybski’s work constituted a general theory of non-elementalistic evaluation. As he would emphasize some years later: 

Abstracting by necessity involves evaluating, whether conscious or not, and so the process of abstracting may be considered as a process of evaluating stimuli, whether it be a “toothache,” “an attack of migraine,” or the reading of a “philosophical treatise.”(2) 

In Korzybski’s usage, evaluating did not require language. Both animals and pre-verbal human infants evaluated—had evaluational reactions—as much as any linguistically-capable adult human did. The difference between animal and human evaluating was roughly indicated in the greater stratification and variety of human reactions connected with symbolism/language. Even when human symbolism/language was involved, evaluation was not mainly a matter of words:

Our actual lives are lived entirely on the objective levels [represented by the circle on the structural differential], including the un-speakable ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ ., [etc.,] the verbal levels being only auxiliary, and effective only if they are translated back into first order un-speakable effects, such as an object, an action, a ‘feeling’., all on the silent and un-speakable objective levels. (3) 

As a term equivalent to ‘evaluational’, he decided to use the adjective ‘semantic’, without the final “s”, as a modifier to other words, as in “semantic (evaluational) ills”, “semantic (evaluational) blockages”, “semantic (evaluational) flexibility”, etc. In the first half of 1931, perhaps due to his long mulling over of Pavlov’s reflexology, he had begun formulating about evaluation in general in terms of “semantic reflexes”. But by August he decided the implications of the term “reflex” (two-valued, on-off, etc.) couldn’t adequately cover the variety and complexity of human evaluation—no matter how often people seemed to indulge in “knee jerk” responses. The more general term “reaction” covered reflexes as well as more complex states of behavior. The term “semantic reaction(s)”, which he abbreviated as “s.r”, referred to the non-elementalistic and un-speakable reactions to words, symbols, and other events he had been concerning himself with.

Now he had a name beside “evaluation” for the behavioral focus of his work: “The non-el study of the s.r becomes an extremely general scientific discipline.…The present work is written entirely from the s.r point of view;…”(4) As for the name of his work, he would call the general study of semantic reactions, general semantics. He added a long section “On semantic reactions” which became the largest part of Chapter II, “Terminology and Meanings”. Then he went through another round of replenishing the manuscript., changing mentions of ‘thought(s)’ and ‘feeling(s)’ to “semantic reaction(s)”or “s.r”and putting in “semantic,” and “semantically” where they seemed to fit to emphasize his evaluational thrust.

Korzybski had derived his choice of terms from the Greek root, semainein (to mean, to signify). He had wanted to give a historical nod to pioneers in the study of ‘meaning’— Michel Bréal, Ogden and Richards, Lady Victoria Welby, logicians like Chwistek, etc.—although he hadn’t been influenced by any of them in any significant way. Their studies were mainly concerned with more or less elementalistic linguistic and symbolic meanings. ‘Meanings’ or significations could certainly be ‘stretched’ to include the non-verbal, neurological, evaluative responses to events—including language and other symbols—that Korzybski was interested in. But the term ‘semantic(s)’ had so much historical baggage related to linguistic meanings, the history of words, etc., that many people would find it hard to put that aside in considering Korzybski’s use of semantic reaction and general semantics. As a result, the principle of least effort tended to operate. Many people, supporters and critics alike, would confuse Korzybski’s work with the more elementalistic studies of verbal and philosophical “semantics”. (In the first few years after the book came out, Korzybski may have added to the confusion himself—at times casually using “semantics” to refer to his own work.)

Nonetheless, in the book, he had made it abundantly clear: any s.r, i.e., semantic (evaluational) reaction, constituted an un-speakable, psycho-logical response to an event with “a number of aspects, an ‘affective’, and an ‘intellectual’, a physiological, a colloidal, and what not.”(5) It was not words, although any response to words or symbolism necessarily involved s.r. One could go through the text and find numerous examples (almost any reference to s.r) where he explicitly differentiated “language” from the “s.r” connected with it. Discussing the different forms of identification, he made sure to note that one form of it involved “the identification of our s.r and states with words…”(6) 

Insofar as he was dealing with issues of language, Korzybski had thus taken an organismic tack radically different from the approach of the verbally-oriented “semanticists”. Language related to general behavior because, “In different people, through experience, associations, relations, meanings, and s.r are built into some symbol.”(7) At a relatively ‘low’ order of response, say “For the infant, a cry or a word becomes semantic magic. In Pavlov’s language, a word governs a conditional reflex.”(8) Unless this mechanism was understood, adults also seemed likely to respond to language in a similar reflex manner. This was why Korzybski harped so much on the importance of people retraining themselves with the structural differential and consciously using his terminology and the various linguistic devices he had proposed, if they wanted to change their s.r for the better:

We do not realize what tremendous power the structure of an habitual language has. It is not an exaggeration to say that it enslaves us through the mechanism of s.r and that the structure which a language exhibits, and impresses upon us unconsciously, is automatically projected upon the world around us. This semantic power is indeed so unbelievable that I do not know any one, even among well-trained scientists, who, after having admitted some argument as correct, does not the next minute deny or disregard (usually unconsciously) practically every word he had admitted, being carried away again by the structural implications of the old language and his s.r . (9)  

Many of the people, some of them ‘followers’, who insisted on calling Korzybski’s work “semantics”, exhibited this kind of mechanism. Their continued use of the old terminology led to an abundance of confused s.r and became an obstacle to understanding and using Korzybski’s system. Korzybski would end up expending considerable effort trying to correct the confusion. For one thing, soon after the book came out he began writing about “neuro-semantic” and “neuro-linguistic” factors, reactions, issues, etc., (see his 1934-1935 “Outline of General Semantics”). Appending “neuro-” to “semantic” and “linguistic” gave these terms a more explicit, organism-as-a-whole connection to evaluation. His use of the two terms, usually side by side, indicated somewhat different but related aspects of evaluation with the neuro-linguistic realm a subset of the neuro-semantic. This new usage would lead to some new and fruitful formulating—by 1940 he had begun to explicitly talk about human cultures in terms of neuro-linguistic and neuro-semantic environments. Neuro-semantic environments, for example, included not just linguistic factors as such but any of the media later explored by Marshall McLuhan and other “media ecologists”. In the 1930s, after the book was published, Korzybski also devised a non-verbal practice he called “semantic relaxation” or “neuro-semantic relaxation.” This form of muscular manipulation used to reduce ‘emotional’ tensions would be hard to understand for anyone who, in regard to Korzybski’s work, insisted “semantics” had to have something directly to do with language and an elementalistic approach to linguistic ‘meaning’.

Notes 

You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 

2. “The Role of Language in the Perceptual Processes”, in Alfred Korzybski Collected Writings, p. 686. 

3. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 35. 

4. Ibid., p. 25. 

5. Ibid., p. 23. 

6. Ibid., p. 456.

7. Ibid., p. 513. 

8. Ibid., p. 512. 

9. Ibid., pp. 90–91. 

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Chapter 38 - "General Semantics": Part 1 - Introduction

Korzybski: A Biography (Free Online Edition)

Copyright © 2014 (2011) by Bruce I. Kodish 

All rights reserved. Copyright material may be quoted verbatim without need for permission from or payment to the copyright holder, provided that attribution is clearly given and that the material quoted is reasonably brief in extent.

At the start of 1931, Korzybski still lacked one main formulational piece for the book—a label for his own approach more specific than “non-aristotelian”. The work of a number of other individuals could be called non-aristotelian too. What he had attempted to formulate strained the conventional vocabularies of every discipline he drew from and required new terminology, including a new name. His theory encompassed, or at least intersected with, ‘psychology’, ‘philosophy’, ‘logic’, etc., but couldn’t exactly be encompassed by any one of those fields. He had eliminated “human engineering” and “humanology” as choices. The “general theory of time-binding”, while broadly descriptive, didn’t quite get to the way he was looking at human behavior. He liked “general anthropology” and considered it fitting, but his friend C.K. Ogden didn’t. Alfred deferred to Ogden. He mentioned the term in the book, but continued to look around for another way to describe the discipline he was forming. 

He needed a name for his basic subject—what he was studying. As much as he wrote about language, he was actually focused on a particular holistic (non-elementalistic)—and more general—view of human behavior. Any use of language (mathematics included) inevitably involved a related, non-verbal response. It was this non-verbal response that concerned him:

...the psycho-logical reaction of a given individual to words and language and other symbols and events in connection with their meanings, and the psycho-logical reactions, which become meanings and relational configurations the moment the given individual begins to analyse them or somebody else does that for him.” (1) 

This non-verbal reaction, by necessity psychophysiological, involved an organism-as-a-whole functioning with and as a nervous system in an environment. Electro-colloidal correlates had to be involved. As much as he admired Pavlov’s work, Korzybski did not want to neglect the importance of the so-called ‘subjective’ or ‘introspective’ dimension of the individual’s response—a direct fact for the individual, which had to be inferred by others. A suitable name for this form of non-elementalistic reaction would also have to do away with the elementalistic separation of ‘emotion’ from ‘intellect’, ‘thinking’ from ‘feeling’.

Notes 

You may download a pdf of all of the book's reference notes (including a note on primary source material and abbreviations used) from the link labeled Notes on the Contents page. The pdf of the Bibliography, linked on the Contents page contains full information on referenced books and articles. 

1. Korzybski 1994 (1933), p. 24.

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